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A STUDY OF THE LEGAL FACETS STEMMING FROM THE
MOVEMENT TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION LIMITING
INCOME TAX RATES TO 25 PER CENT
By
FRANK

E. PACKARD*

The idea of a constitutional ceiling placed upon the power of the government
to tax is nothing new or revolutionary as we have seventeen precedents for such a
scheme in the form of seventeen States which have self-imposed limitations in their
constitutions on the power to tax. These limitations are set forth as annual maxima
and are of three types: firstly, a number of mills per dollar of the assessed valuation
of all taxable property in the state; secondly, a number of cents per hundred dollars
valuation; and thirdly, a percentage rate on the valuation. The first type is represented by the following States and numbers of mills respectively: South Dakota,'
two mills; Utah, 2 two and four-tenths mills; Oklahoma,' three and one-half mills;
Colorado, 4 four mills; New Mexico, 5 four mills; North Dakota,6 four mills; Wy-

oming,7 four mills; Georgia,8 five mills; Louisiana, 9 five and one-quarter mills;
Idaho, 10 ten mills; and Nevada," fifty mills. The second type is represented by
the following States and numbers of cents respectively: Missouri,' 2 twenty cents;
Texas,' 3 thirty-five cents; and West Virginia, 14 one hundred cents. The third type
is represented by the following States and percentages respectively: Alabama, 15 six7
6
ty-five one-hundredths of one per cent; Arkansas,' one per cent; and Michigan,1
one and one-half per cent. It will be noted that none of these constitutional ceilings
placed upon the power of a government to tax obtain in any of the Eastern or
New England States.
Great progress has been made in the movement, begun in 1939, to secure
an amendment to the Constitution of the United States limiting income tax rates
*LL.D., Hamline University; Senior Partner in the Chicago Law Firm of Packard and Evans;
Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Illinois and of the Supreme Court of the United States.
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S. D. CONST. 1889, Art. XI, sec. 1.
UTAH CONST. 1896, Art. XIII, sec. 7.
OKL. CONST. 1907, Art. X, sec. 9.
COL. CONST. 1876, Art. X, sec. 11.
N. M. CONST. 1911, Art. VIII, sec, 2.
N. D. CONST. 1889, Art. XI, sec. 174.
WYOMING CONST. 1890, Art. XV, sec. 4.
GA. CONST. 1945, Art. VII. VII, sec. 1, par. 2, clause 3.
LA. CONST. 1921, Art. X, sec. 3.
IDAHO CONST. 1890, Art. VII, sec. 9.
NEV. CONST. 1864, Art. X, sec. 145,01.
Mo. CONST. ,1875, Art. X ,sec. 8.
TEX. CONST. 1876, Art. VIII, sec. 9.
W. VA. CONST. 1872, Art. X, sec. 1.
ALA. CONST. 1901, Art. XI, sec. 214.
ARK. CONST. 1874, Art. XVI, sec. 8.
MICH. CONST. 1908, Art. sec. 21.
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to twenty-five per cent in peacetime. The mode of amending the Constitution
pursued is by State legislatures applying to the Congress to call a convention proposing amendments. No amendment to the Constitution has been effectuated by
the use of this method. Resolutions in favor of the income tax rate-ceiling amendment memorializing the Congress to call a convention have been passed by
the legislatures of twenty-six States-Wyoming, Rhode Island, Mississippi, Iowa,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Indiana, Arkansas, Delaware, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Illinois, Wisconsin, Alabama, Kentucky, New Jersey, New Hampshire,
Nebraska, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Kansas and Florida.
However, four states-Illinois,',8 Alabama,' 9 Wisconsin 20 and Kentucky-subsequently took action to rescind their respective resolutions.
Rescissions were not effectuated in the foregoing premises for the following
three reasons:
1. New Jersey and Ohio2 2 were among the States which ratified the proposed
Fourteenth Amendment 28 Subsequently, New Jersey and Ohio 24 took action
to rescind their respective ratifications. However, after passage of ratifications
by the necessary three-fourths States, the Congress passed a resolution2 5 listing
the ratifying States and included New Jersey and Ohio. The Congress transmitted such resolutions to the Department of State. Secretary of State William
H. Seward, in pursuance of such resolution and acting under statutory duty,
issued his certification26 declaring the Fourteenth Amendment an integral part
of the Constitution. In his certification, Secretary of State Seward also listed the
ratifying States and included New Jersey and Ohio.
2. New York was among the States which ratified the proposed Fifteenth Amendment. Subsequently, New York took action to rescind her ratification. However, after passage of ratifications by the requisite three-fourths States, Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, acting under statutory duty, issued his certification27
declaring the Fifteenth Amendment an integral part of the Constitution. In
his certification Secretary of State Fish listed the ratifying States and included New York.
3. In the cases of all but one of the twenty-two amendments to the Constitution,
the Congress directed ratification to be by State legislatures. Only in the case
of the Twenty-First Amendment did the Congress direct the ratification to
be by State conventions. This exception to the general policy historically fol18 Ill.
Laws 1945, p. 1797.
19 Ala. Acts 1945, p. 155.
20 Wis. Laws 1944-1945, pp. 1126, 1127.
21 Ky. Acts 1946, p. 720.
22 Ohio Laws 1867, pp. 320, 321.
25 14 U. S. Stat. at L. 358.

24 65 Ohio Laws 280.
25 15 U. S. Stat. at L. 709, 710.

2 15 .U S. Stat. at L. 708, 709.
27 16 U. S. Stat. at L. 1131, 1132.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

VOL. 56

lowed was made seemingly ex industria. The only feasible reason for the exception is that the Twenty-First Amendment is the only amendment which
repealed a preceding amendment (the Eighteenth Amendment). The Congress
apparently thought that in order for the States to ratify the proposed TwentyFirst Amendment and thus to rescind the prior action that their respective
legislatures had taken in ratifying the Eighteenth Amendment ratifying action
by an agency closer to the seats of sovereignty-the peoples of the States themselves-was necessary and, therefore, designated conventions as the mode of
ralification.
The text of the resolutions specifies that the limitations upon the income
tax rates " . . . shall, however, be subject to the qualification that in the event

of a war in which the United States is engaged creating a grave national emergency
requiring such action to avoid national disaster . . ." such limitations may be

deferred. The phraseology employed is broad enough to include "a police action"
for in 1941 in the case of Verano V. De A'ngelis Coal Co. the District Court of the
United States for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that ".

.

. a formal

declaration of war is not necessary before it can be said that a condition of war
exists. . "28

The Wyoming legislature passed its resolution twelve years ago. Mississippi
and Rhode Island passed their resolutions eleven years ago. It might be contended
by opponents of the movement to secure the income tax rate-limitation amendment
that an unreasonable length of time has elapsed since passage of the resolutions
by Wyoming, Mississippi and Rhode Island and, therefore, the resolutions passed
by these three States no longer can be counted. Such an argument would be based
partly on the holding in the case of Dillon v. Gloss 29 that Article V of the

Constitution impliedly requires amendments submitted to be ratified within a
reasonable time after proposal; that the Congress may fix a reasonable time for
ratification, and that the period of seven years fixed by the Congress was reasonable. However, the fallaciousness of this contention becomes apparent when we
consider the following statement by Mr. Justice Van Devanter in the unanimous
decisioh in the Dillon case: " . . . proposal and ratification are not treated as

unrelated acts but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference
being that they are not to be widely separated in time." 8 0 Thus, the reasonable
length of time necessary is the interval between proposal and ratification. The
reasonable-length-of-time doctrine is inapplicable to the movement to secure the
income tax rate-ceiling amendment as there has been no proposal as yet of such
income tax rate-limitation amendment. There can be no proposal until the Congress
calls a convention, the convention proposes amendments and the Congress directs
the mode of ratification.
28 41 F. Supp. 954, 955 (1941).
29 256 U. S. 368 (1921).

80 256 U. S. 368, 374, 375 (1921).
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The foregoing contention by opponents of the movement to secure the income
tax rate-ceiling amendment is also based on the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice
Butler, 1 in which Mr. Justice McReynolds concurred, 82 in 1938 in the case of Coleman v. Miller. Mr. Justice Butler was of the opinion that the thirteen years intervening between the time the Congress proposed the Child Labor Amendment
and the time the Kansas legislature ratified same constituted an unreasonable
length of time. However, here again, in a dissenting opinion, as in the opinion
of the Court in the Dillon case, the reasonable-length-of-time doctrine is measured
from the time of proposal; and until there is proposal, the doctrine is inapplicable.
The question arises as to whether under the terms of Article V when thirty-two
State legislatures pass resolutions memorializing the Congress to call a convention
for the purpose of proposing constitutional amendments it is mandatory or discretionary with the Congress to call a convention. The authorities are in agreement
that under such circumstances it is mandatory upon the Congress to call a convention.
Professor Henry Rottschaefer stated that amendments " . . . may be proposed by
Congress on its own initiative whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it
necessary, or by a convention called for that purpose which Congress is required to
38
call on application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the States." Professor
Westel Woodbury Willoughby wrote as follows: "It would appear that the act
thus required of Congress is a purely ministerial one in substance, if not in form,
34
and the obligation to perform it is stated in imperative form by the Constitution."
In the words of Article V "The Congress... on the application of the legislatures
of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a convention proposing amendments."
35
As long ago as 1816 it was held by Mr. Justice Story in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee
that the word "shall" imports the imperative and the mandatory.
There are already outstanding enough State legislatures which have passed
resolutions pertaining to other subject matter so that these added to the twenty-six
State legislatures which have passed resolutions in favor of the income tax
rate-limitation amendment make up the necessary two-thirds States which, according to the terms of Article V, make it imperative for the Congress to call a convention. Before the first State (Wyoming) legislature passed a resolution regarding an income tax rate-ceiling amendment in 1939, there were already outstanding
thirty-six State legislatures which had passed resolutions memorializing the
Congress to call a convention. The source for this statement is the compilation
showing the applications made from time to time to the Senate by the legislatures
of various States for the calling of a constitutional convention for the purpose
31 307 U. S. 433, 470 (1938).
32 307 U. S. 433, 474 (1938).

33 Rottschaefer, Henry, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, West Publishing Co.,
St. Paul, Minn., 1939, p. 388.

34 Willoughby, Westel Woodbury, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Baker,
Voorhis and Co., N. Y., 1929, Vol. I, p. 597.
85 14 U. S. 304, 4 L. Ed. 97, 103 (1816).
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of proposing certain amendments to the Constitution of the United States presented by Senator Tydings of Maryland during the second session of the seventyfirst Congress in 1930.86 The compilation by Senator Tydings was recognized as
authoritative, in the report to the New York Bar Association on December 31,
1930 by the Committee of Five (Henry W. Taft, Chairman, Wilbur F. Earp,
Edward G. Griffin, Wesley H. Maider, Roscoe R. Mitchell and Isaac R. Oeland)
to Look into and Report on the General Proposals Pending in Congress to
Amend the Federal Constitution as follows: "At the Second Session of the 71st
Congress, however, Senator Tydings presented to the Senate a compilation showing
all of the applications for the calling of a constitutional convention which had been
made to Congress since the adoption of the Constitution. The statement was printed as Document No. 78. It seems to show that 36 ... states have filed petitions.

Upon the information contained in Senator Tydings' statement our report is based." 87 However, since nine of the thirty-six States-Arkansas, 83 California,8 9 Kentucky, 40 Minnesota, 41 New Jersey, 42 Pennsylvania, 43 Utah, 44 Maine 45 and Wyoming 6-had passed only resolutions exclusively concerning the advocating of the direct election of United States Senators, the Seventeenth Amendment would seem to
have negated the efficacy of the resolutions by these nine States and, therefore,
to discount these nine States in the matter. This view is fortified by the following
statement by Professor Lester Bernhardt Orfield: "In 1901 several legislatures
petitioned for a convention to consider an amendment for the popular election
of Senators, and by 1909 twenty-six states had petitioned for that purpose. The
adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment would perhaps destroy the effect of
these petitions." 47 This view is further fortified by the following excerpt from
the report to the New York Bar Association on December 31, 1930 by the
Committee of Five to Look into and Report on the General Proposals Pending in
Congress to Amend the Federal Constitution: "The petitions for the election of
senators by the direct vote of the people showed a widespread public opinion
favorable to that change. But they were not numerous enough to make it mandatory upon Congress to call the convention, and Congress removed the necessity
for the convention method by responding to the prevailing sentiment and itself
proposed Amendment XVII, which was speedily ratified, the ratification being
proclaimed by the Secretary of State on May 31, 1913. The Committee, therefore,
Sen. Doc. 78, 71st Cong., 2d sess.
74 Cong. Rec. 2924, 2925 (1931), 17 A.B.A.J. 143 (1931).
Ark. Laws 1903, p.483.
s9 Cal. Stat. 1903, p.682.
40 Ky. Acts 1902, p.394.
41 Minn. Laws 1901, p.676.
86
87
8

42
43
44

N. J. Laws 1907, p. 736.
1901, P.L. 860.

Utah Laws 1903, p. 204.
45 Maine Laws 1911.
46 Wyoming Laws 1895, p. 298.
47 Orfield, Lester Bernhardt, THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL
of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1942, pp. 42, 43.
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is of the opinion that as the purpose in filing the petitions for the popular election
of Senators was satisfied . . they have become ineffective. If the same conclusion
is doubtful concerning petitions requesting a convention for general purposes, it
is sufficient to say that the deduction of those petitions relating exdusively to the
popular election of Senators would reduce the number of petitioning states substantially below the required two-thirds.''48 Thus, the nine State legislatures
which passed only resolutions exclusively dealing with the advocating of the
popular election of United States Senators subtracted from the thirty-six State
legislatures which passed various types of resolutions memorializing the Congress
to call a convention plus the twenty-six States which passed resolutions pertaining
to the income tax rate-limitati 6 n amendment is a total of fifty-three States. But,
of course, several of the thirty-six States which passed diverse types of resolutions
are among the twenty-six States which passed resolutions regarding the income
tax rate-ceiling amendment. To be exact, this duplication exists on the part of
thirteen States-Iowa, Michigan, Indiana, Delaware, Texas, Illinois, Wisconsin,
Alabama, Nebraska, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada and Kansas. These thirteen
States subtracted from the previous total of fifty-three States is a total of forty
States or eight more States than are required by the terms of Article V of the
Constitution to make it imperative and mandatory upon the Congress to call
a convention for the purpose of proposing amendments.
A question which arises is whether resolutions which pertain to different
subject matter can be counted together for the purpose of securing the necessary
two-thirds States or only resolutions limited exclusively to the same subject
matter can be counted together for the purpose of securing the requisite twothirds States. The former view is the one accepted by the authorities. Professor
Lester Bernhardt Orfield stated that: "A closely related problem is whether the requests must seek a convention for identical purposes. Should two-thirds of the
legislatures ask a convention for the purpose of a general revision or for the same
specific purpose, there would be no difficulty. But when one legislature desires a
convention for one purpose, as to prohibit polygamy, another legislature for another purpose, as to adopt the initiative and referendum, and a third legislature
for a general purpose, there is some doubt whether the prerequisite for a call
has been met. The better view would seem to be that the ground of" the applications would be immaterial, and that a demand by two-thirds of the states would
conclusively show a widespread desire for constitutional changes."' 49 Mr. Wayne
B. Wheeler, writing in the Illinois Law Review, expressed the following opinion:
"... the sufficiency of a general resolution asking for a convention is unquestionable. Even where thirty-two state legislatures made application for a convention,
each requesting a different amendment it might be considered sufficient to call
48 74 Cong. Rec. 2924, 2926 (1931), 17 A.B.A.J. 143, 145 (1931).
49 Orfield, Lester Bernhardt, THE AMENDING'OF TIHE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, The University of
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1942, p. 42.
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a convention on the ground that they conclusively showed a wide-spread demand
for changes in government...".50
A problem which presents itself is whether, in the event of failure or refusal
on the part of the Congress to call a convention for proposing amendments and in
the event that the pressure of public opinion should prove ineffective, the hand
of the Congress can be forced in the matter. Under the foregoing circumstances
an action at law of mandamus in the District Court of the United States would
lie against every member of the Congress. For precedents there are the cases of
State v. Town Council of South Kingston and Virginia v. West Virginia. In
the former the Supreme Court of Rhode Island issued a writ of mandamus
against a municipal quasi-legislativebody and in the latter the Supreme Court of
the United States held that it had the power to issue a writ of mandamus against
the West Virginia legislature. In the former case the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
stated that: ". . . the question is whether the case alleged is a proper one for the
issue of a writ of mandamus. One office of mandamus is to enforce obedience to
statute law. In general, it lies to compel all officers to perform ministerial duties,
as well as to compel subordinate courts to perform judicial duties; but not to compel
the exercise of discretion in any particular way. It is not contended that the duty
of the town council in this matter is other than ministerial. Mandamus is peculiarly
the proper remedy when other specific remedies are wanting. The remedy which a
legislature can provide is to make a law applicable to the case. When the law
is made, it is for the court to enforce it, or to punish for disobedience of it. In
either function it must construe the statute, i.e. declare what it means. In the
present case, if the law already made imposes a present duty, no further legislation
would make it more imperative. Any legislative act designed as a remedy must
impose ministerial duties upon individuals. The court must again be resorted to,
to compel such individuals to perform those duties. So that in the last analysis
this remedy by mandamus is the only specific and efficient one, and if it is
not afforded there are no other means which can give to the electors the opportunity
to exercise such rights as the law gives them." 51 In the latter case the Supreme
Court of the United States declared that: "The remedy sought, as we have
at the outset seen, is an order in the nature of mandamus commanding the levy
by the legislature of West Virginia of a tax to pay the judgment. Insofar as the
duty to award that remedy is disputed merely because authority to enforce
a judgment against a State may not affect state power, the contention is adversely
52
disposed of by what we have said."
Mr. Walter K. Tuller, writing in the North American Review, stated that:
"Every officer, of whatever branch, is sworn to support and obey the Constitution,
50 Wheller, Wayne B., "Is a Constitutional Convention Impending?" 21 ILL. L. REv. 782, 795
(1927).
51 27 A. 509, 602, 22 L. R. A. 65, 67, 68 (1893).
52 246 U. S. 565, 603, 604, (1918).

25 PER CENT INCOME TAX

and it is the natural presumption, fully justified by our history, that none will
refuse to obey its mandates as interpreted by that body whose function and duty
it is to do so.
"The form of remedy for compelling Congress to act would seem clearly to
be a writ of mandamus. It is believed that such a proceeding may be instituted by
any citizen. Every citizen of the country has a direct interest that the Constitution
shall be obeyed, and that interest is none the less real and entitled to recognition
and protection by the courts that it is not capable of financial computation. Indeed, the very fact that he has no other remedy serves rather, under the established principles governing its issuance, to emphasize his right to this writ. Since
the Constitution does not confer original jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court to
issue writs of mandamus (see Marbury v. Madison, supra), it would be necessary
to commence the action in the courts of the District of Columbia. It has been
settled since the decision of Kendall v. United States, supra, that those courts
have jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus as an original proceeding. From
the decision there an appeal can be taken to the Supreme Court of the United
States."58
58 Tuller, Walter K., "A Convention to Amend the Constitution-Why Needed-How It May
Be Obtained," 11 NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW 369, 382, 383, (1911).

